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 Despite the fact that there are strong  a priori grounds for presuming that the intergovernmental grants 
characteristic of fiscal federalism in Australia may generate fiscal illusion, no empirical effort has been directed 
at this line of inquiry.  The present article seeks to go at least some way towards remedying this deficiency by 
evaluating the flypaper variant of the fiscal illusion hypothesis using a time series analysis of Australian 
Commonwealth expenditures for 1981 to 1992.  The results of these estimations provide some tentative 
empirical support for the existence of a flypaper effect on public expenditure in Australia for the period under 
review. 
 The literature on fiscal federalism has repeatedly identified the absence of close links 
between revenue-raising and expenditure as the worst economic feature of Australian 
federalism.1 The resulting vertical imbalance has left states heavily dependent on financial 
grants from the federal government, and has been blamed for various ills, not least a lack of 
accountability, allocative inefficiencies, and excessive reliance on economically inefficient 
taxes.  It is thus surprising that the potential impact of fiscal illusion on state expenditure has 
been overlooked, especially since one variant of this general hypothesis holds that financial 
grants between fiscal jurisdictions will affect public expenditure in recipient jurisdictions.  
This specific type of fiscal illusion, known as the flypaper effect, forms the subject matter of 
this article. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLYPAPER EFFECT 
The flypaper effect refers to the hypothesized ability of lump-sum grants to increase public 
expenditure by more than an equivalent increase in income from other sources. The term 
"flypaper effect" has been attributed by Louise Marshall to the observation that "money sticks 
where it hits".2 Intergovernmental grants are thought to progressively raise the costs of inquiry 
into the recipient government's fiscal parameters, and consequently result in a higher level of 
expenditure than would have been the case in the absence of such grants. Developed by Paul 
Courant, Edward Gramlich and Daniel Rubinfeld,3 and Wallace Oates4, the argument holds 
that budget-maximizing politicians and bureaucrats use lump-sum grant revenues to expand 
public expenditure rather than return these revenues to taxpayers, either directly via rebates or 
indirectly through reduced taxes.  Oates has postulated that this is accomplished by fostering 
the illusion that not only are actual average tax rates falling, but the marginal taxprice(s) of 
public goods are also lower.5  As a result, the electorate may be willing to support a higher 
level of spending than would have been the case had the fiscal parameters been assessed 
accurately. 
 Three general approaches have been pursued in the empirical analysis of the flypaper 
effect. First, some researchers have included intergovernmental grants as one of many 
potential sources of fiscal illusion in regression exercises, and have found that grants are 
indeed an important determinant in the level of public good expenditure.6 
 Second, some writers such as Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld7 and Oates8 argue that 
grants reduce the average price of public goods, and that voters base their decisions on this 
price rather than on the actual marginal taxprice.  Both Philip Grossman9 and Marshall10 
represent recent examples of this empirical approach to the flypaper effect.  Grossman posited 
that the degree of illusion caused by grants was a function of the level of indirectness.  A 
federal grant, for example, would be more indirect or remote than a state grant in terms of 
local government finance, and as a result have a greater effect on the level of local 
expenditures.  Grossman regressed various socioeconomic variables and categories of grants, 
both federal and state, conditional and unconditional, against expenditures for local 
government areas.11  The results vindicated earlier studies in supporting the stimulative effects 
of grants, as well as Grossman's  own hypothesis that "federal unconditional grants generate, 
at the minimum, approximately twice the increase in local expenditures as do state 
unconditional grants".12  In a slightly different approach, Marshall used an exogenous illusion 
variable, tax windfalls, to analyze the flypaper illusionary hypothesis. Using a set of 
socioeconomic indicators (including the tax windfall) and a level of state expenditures, 
Marshall found results consistent with "the absence of any systematic effect of the tax 
windfalls upon the level of state expenditure".13 
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 Third, Stanley Winer14 and Robert Logan15 argue that intergovernmental grants may 
induce voters to believe that their tax burden is being transferred to other fiscal jurisdictions.  
Winer began his study by observing that "there is an obvious temptation for politicians to 
foster the belief that the cost of public services will fall disproportionately on someone else."16  
In so doing, he provided the rationale for the analysis of a federal system in which spending 
and taxation decisions are separated, and may therefore have a systematic and biased effect on 
the level of expenditures.17  Utilising Canadian provincial data, Winer reasoned that since 
federal taxation is levied nationally, federal grants-in-aid may induce a belief among a 
recipient province's voters that public services are being financed by non-residents.  
Consequently grants, and especially unconditional grants, reduce the perceived taxprice of 
provincial public goods and may well bias expenditures upward.  This may be the case even if 
it is not possible to shift the taxation burden externally.  As shown in Table 1, Winer's 
analysis regressed provincial income, federal grants and interprovincial grants against net 
provincial expenditures.  He also included dummies for the different categories of recipient 
and donor provinces.  Winer found that the results indicated "that the separation created by the 
grant system did reduce perceived taxprices and increase expenditures" and that the "impact 
elasticity of grants with respect to expenditure for the poor Atlantic provinces (recipient) is 
about twice as large as that for the rich provinces (donor)".18 
(Table 1 about here) 
 Logan19, and later David Hammes and Douglas Wills20 modified Winer's21 "partial 
equilibrium" approach by incorporating the effect of fiscal illusion on the grantor 
governments taxprice as well as that of the recipient.  Logan based such an analysis on the fact 
that although voters were subject to incomplete information, they were still rational, and that 
they were faced with the perception that federal taxes were rising but services were not, and 
that state taxes were falling but services were not.  From this, he surmised that the contrasting 
effects of misperceived taxprices would mean an upward bias of recipient expenditures, and a 
downward bias of donor expenditures exclusive of grants.  Table 1 shows that Logan 
regressed per capita measures of income, federal aid, state expenditure and unemployment 
against per capita federal non-aid expenditure for a U.S. national time-series.  The results 
indicated that a negative relationship did indeed exist between the level of federal 
expenditures on aid, and the level of federal non-aid expenditures:  proof that modification of 
taxprices occurred at the donor level.22 Such results inferred per se that tax prices were 
changed in the opposite direction for recipient expenditures, which supports the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis.23  Hammes and Wills used an identical analysis for Canadian data and arrived at a 
similar conclusion.24 
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 Despite empirical support for the flypaper effect, several alternative hypotheses have been 
developed.  Thomas Romer and Harold Rosenthal argue that where the public budgetary 
agenda is dominated by political agents, the outcome may be determined by threat tactics.25  
In this manner, an upward bias in expenditures need not infer any systematic illusion such as 
the flypaper effect.  William Dougan and Daphne Kenyon explain the flypaper effect as the 
result of lobbying by local pressure groups.26  As a result the stimulative effect of grants need 
not be the outcome of a widespread taxprice illusion but rather the alteration of the relative 
wealth positions of various pressure groups.  Oates has drawn on both Romer and Rosenthal 
and Dougan and Kenyon to argue that normal political budgetary processes may fulfil the 
theoretical role of fiscal illusion in biasing expenditures upwards, and that the stimulative 
effect of grants is incorrectly attributed to the flypaper illusion.27 
MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
As we have seen, much previous empirical analysis of the flypaper effect has focused on the 
effects of federal transfers on recipient jurisdictional expenditures.  This approach accepts the 
basic proposition underlying the flypaper effect that intergovernmental grants lower the 
perceived taxprice of recipient expenditures.28  Moreover, Logan's "dual-illusion hypothesis" 
holds that a similar, but reversed, illusion will affect voters' perceptions of grantor 
expenditures.29  Within a grantor/recipient model, increases in grants will lower the perceived 
price of recipient expenditures, but will increase the price of grantor expenditures, and 
therefore make federal expenditures more expensive.  Accordingly, "when a government unit 
increases its level of intergovernmental grant disbursements, the demand for its services 
falls".30  In general, a reduction in grantor "own" expenditures as a result of modifications in 
the perceived prices of grantor and recipient expenditures should offer alternative prima facie 
evidence of fiscal illusion.31 
 Table 2 shows the models and variables used for analyzing the effect of fiscal illusion on 
federal expenditures.  The reduced form expenditure equations are adapted from Logan32 and 
Hammes and Wills33, and will be evaluated in both (1) linear and (2) log-linear forms.  In 
common with the two previous approaches, regression analysis is used to evaluate the 
significance of time-series modifications in perceived prices on non-grant expenditure. 
(Table 2 about here) 
 Such an approach is not without criticism.  As Logan has noted "it is a very simple 
framework for describing expenditure determination in a federal system ... the model can be 
regarded as a simple expositional tool for a first attempt at analysing grants in a more general 
context".34  In particular, the model employed identifies only that a modification in grantor 
prices has occurred, not the source of this modification.  Given that the flypaper hypothesis 
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states that illusion exists only if a transfer of income by the federal system to the median voter 
has not occurred, the model is unable to differentiate between rational, informed actions and 
those exhibiting illusionary behavior.  At best "it may be fruitful to analyze general 
equilibrium grant effects with other models of grantor/recipient expenditure determination".35 
 The dependent variable is real per capita federal non-grant expenditures (Eg). Expenditure 
is an imperfect proxy for actual public good output, although it has been accepted in the 
absence of a more suitable measure.36  The level of expenditure net of grants is used, given 
that the flypaper effect hypothesis predicts that non-grant federal expenditures will fall, even 
though total expenditures may well increase. 
 The first composite independent variable (1/Pg')Y represents the fraction of income 
directed to grantor government expenditure under the perceived price of grantor services (Pg').  
Since Pg' is not directly observable, a proxy used by Logan37 and Hammes and Wills38 is the 
ratio of federal grants to federal direct (non-grant) expenditures.  Given that "grantor aid 
lowers the perceived price of recipient government expenditures and raises the perceived price 
of grantor government expenditures ... the coefficient on income falls ... as the perceived 
relative price changes encourage voters to spend a larger fraction of income on recipient 
government expenditures".39 
 The second variable (Pr'/Pg') represents the perceived relative prices of grantor (federal) 
and recipient (state/municipality) expenditures.  In order to calculate this measure, a proxy for 
Pr' has also been derived, being the ratio of total federal grants to total state and municipal 
expenditures.40  The coefficient on the measure (Pr'/Pg') should be negative, indicating that as 
the perceived price of recipient expenditure falls relative to the perceived price of grantor 
expenditures, federal non-grant expenditures will fall. 
 The next variable is (1/Pg'), which is the relative importance of federal grants in terms of 
total federal expenditure, direct and indirect.  As this measure increases, the concentration of 
disbursements upon grants should further contract expenditures of the recipient government. 
 Finally, Logan41 and Hammes and Wills42 have supported the inclusion of an institutional 
constraint designed to measure automatic variations in grantor expenditures.  This has been 
proxied by the unemployment rate (U) given that there are likely to be "automatic variations 
in federal government expenditures during times of higher unemployment".43  As an 
alternative, Logan used both unemployment and a qualitative variable for war (for periods 
when the U.S. was engaged in expensive foreign conflicts) for these unobservable institutional 
constraints.  The expected coefficient on unemployment when regressed against federal non-
grant expenditures should be positive.44 
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RESULTS 
The model of federal expenditure and fiscal illusion in Table 2 allowed for the analysis of the 
dual hypothesis of the flypaper effect.  In this approach, the grant system provides a distortion 
of the taxprice of the public good for both the recipient and donor, so that the relevant 
perceived taxprice of the public good falls and increases respectively.  Moreover, evidence of 
a decrease in donor (federal) non-grant expenditures as a result of an increase in the tax price 
of federal expenditures would provide prima facie evidence of fiscal illusion at the level of 
the recipient (state).  The results of the time-series analysis of Australian Commonwealth 
expenditures 1981-1982 presented in Table 3, correspond directly to the linear and log-linear 
models presented in Table 2. 
(Table 3 Here) 
 Model 1 in Table 3 details the results of a linear regression of four composite independent 
variables on the dependent variable of real per capita non-aid grantor expenditures.  The 
coefficient for the variable (1/Pg')Y, which represents the fraction of income directed to 
grantor expenditures, is positive and significant, conforming to a priori expectations.  The 
coefficient for the second variable (Pr'/Pg'), representing the perceived relative price of 
grantor (federal) to recipient (state) expenditures, is also significant and conforms to the 
expected sign.  The third variable's coefficient representing the relative importance of the 
grant role in the federal structure (1/Pg') also corresponds to the a priori sign and level of 
significance.  Finally, the coefficient for the institutional constraint U (unemployment) is 
positive and significant, indicating that an increase in institutional obligations is associated 
with an increase in federal non-grant expenditure.  The coefficients obtained correspond with 
the Canadian study of Hammes and Wills which supported the fiscal illusion hypothesis, but 
run counter to the U.S. evidence of Logan.45  However, it has been argued that to some extent 
the Logan results are also supportive of fiscal illusion, the divergence in implications coming 
from "certain institutional differences which may change the interpretation placed upon the 
similar numerical results".46 
 In terms of the econometric suitability of the model, the DW statistic (2.14812) lies above 
the inconclusive range (0.339-1.913), indicating the absence of autocorrelated errors.  
Additional tests for autocorrelation, the Lagrange multiplier and Box-Pierce-Ljung methods, 
also support this finding.  However, a Ramsay RESET model-specification test indicates that 
the linear model is functionally misspecified, similar to the procedure and results observed by 
Logan and Hammes and Wills. 
 In accordance with the above, and the studies of Logan and Hammes and Wills, a log-
linear specification was employed in Model 2.  The signs on the coefficients are unaltered, as 
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are the levels of significance.  This accords with earlier work showing that "the estimated 
coefficients for the alternative were found to be significant (and virtually identical to the 
estimated coefficients [in the linear model])".47  The DW statistic (2.3278) once again fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, similarly for the alternative tests.  However, 
the Ramsey RESET specification tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of the model being 
correctly specified, and we may conclude that the log-linear form is functionally superior to 
that of Model 1.  A test employed to select between linear and log-linear formulations also 
supports this notion.  These results confirm those of Logan where "the nonlinear specification 
... does seem to do a better job of explaining the data.  Both rounds of the test indicate a 
strong preference for this model", and are stronger than Hammes and Wills ambiguous 
outcome.48 
 The methodology employed, and the results obtained in the "dual-illusion" hypothesis 
above are consistent with the U.S. findings of Logan and the Canadian study of Hammes and 
Wills.  In these studies, "federal non-aid direct expenditure [is] inversely correlated with 
federal grant aid to the provincial and municipal governments" as a result of modifications in 
the perceived relative prices of grantor and recipient expenditures.49 By itself this would 
appear to lend support for the distortionary effect of grants at the grantor level, and thereby the 
fiscal illusion hypothesis of the flypaper effect.  However, as noted previously, the limitations 
of the model are readily apparent, and it is "a very simple framework ... a simple expositional 
tool for a first attempt at analysing the effects of grants in a more general context". 
CONCLUSION 
To the best of our knowledge, the present article represents the first attempt at the empirical 
analysis of fiscal illusion in Australia caused by the existence of intergovernmental grants 
between the states and the federal government .  The results from the estimation procedures 
employed provide some support for the existence of the flypaper effect in Australia.  
However, given the inherent limitations in the model underlying these estimations, the results 
obtained should be treated with caution.  Further empirical work on the flypaper effect in the 
Australian constitutional milieu is necessary to confirm this tentative finding. 
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TABLE 1   
Summary of Major Studies of the Flypaper Effect 
 
Authora Datab Estimation 
techniquec  
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent 
Variablesd 
Major 
Findings 
Winer  10 Canadian 
provinces, 
pooled time-
series, cross-
sectional. 
(panel) 
1952/53 -  
1969/70 
TSLS Net provincial 
expenditure 
Per capita income (+ lagged 
income), federal grants (+ 
lagged grants), grants to other 
provinces (+ lagged other 
grants), dummies for 
population and provincial 
groups (donor and recipient) 
Expenditure 
separation reduces 
perceived tax prices 
and increases 
expenditures.  
Elasticity with respect 
to grants higher in 
recipient provinces. 
Logan  US national 
Time-series 
1947-1983 
OLS 
(linear and 
non-
linear) 
Per capita 
federal direct 
not-aid 
expenditure 
Per capita income, per capita 
total federal aid to state and 
local expenditure, per capital 
total state and local 
expenditure, unemployment 
rate, dummy for war. 
Study of fiscal 
illusion on grantor 
government.  Grants 
expected to reduce 
perceived price of 
recipient government 
goods and raise price 
of grantor 
government goods 
leading to a fall in 
non-aid expenditure 
at grantor level.  
Support of "flypaper" 
effect at grantor level. 
Hammes 
and Wills  
Canadian 
national 
Time series 
1962-1984 
OLS (log-
linear and 
non-
linear) 
Real per 
capital federal 
non-aid 
expenditures 
 
 
Real per capita 
recipient 
government 
expenditures 
Perceived price of grantor 
(federal) expenditures, per 
capita national income, 
perceived price of recipient 
(provincial and local) 
expenditures. 
Perceived price of grantor 
expenditures, per capita 
national income, perceived 
price of recipient expenditures. 
Results similar to that 
of Logan in the 
modification of 
public good prices at 
grantor and recipient 
level.  Support for 
hypothesis of 
"flypaper effect". 
Marshall  US states 
Cross-
sectional  
1986 
TSLS Expenditure 
per capita 
Per capita income, estimated 
per capita tax windfall, per 
capita intergovernmental 
revenue, price of public goods 
(employee salaries), 
population, state share of final 
expenditure on public goods, 
urban population, density. 
Windfall revenue 
positive though 
insignificant in the 
effect on expenditure 
in line with 
competitive pressures 
limiting the effect of 
fiscal illusion. 
Grossman  Virginian 
localities 
Cross-
sectional 
1982 and 
1983 
TSLS Three 
expenditure 
categories; 
education, 
public safety 
and general 
administration 
Federal + state unconditional 
grants, state unconditional 
grants, federal + state 
categorical grants, median 
household income, tax price 
(local) share, percentage urban 
population, percentage black 
Unconditional grants 
are positive and 
significant in 
increasing the level of 
expenditure 
a See, in the order in which they appear, Winer, "Some Evidence on the Effect of Spending"; Logan, "Fiscal 
Illusion and Grantor Government"; Hammes and Wills, "Fiscal Illusion and Grantor Government in Canada"; 
Marshall, "Fiscal Illusion in Public Finance", and Marshall, "New Evidence on Fiscal Illusion"; Grossman, 
"The Impact of Federal and State Grants". 
b
 Singular dates represent cross-sectional studies, intervals time-series. Where two dates are given, different 
years for some cross-sectional variables have been used. 
9 
c
 OLS/TSLS - Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares respectively 
d
 Italicised independent variables indicate significant values at 90 percent or more. 
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TABLE 2   
Models and Variables for Federal Expenditure and Fiscal Illusion 
 
Method 
 
Time-series analysis of Australian Commonwealth expenditures 1981-1992 
 
Models 
 
(1) Egt = β0 + β1 (1/Pg')Yt + β2(Pr'/Pg')t + β3(1/Pg')t + β4U + ut  
 
(2) lnEgt = lnδ0 + lnδ1 (1/Pg')Yt + lnδ2(Pr'/Pg')t + lnδ3(1/Pg')t + lnδ4U + vt  
 
Variables Details Data Source(s) Expected 
Sign 
 
Eg 
 
Real per capita federal 
direct (non-grant) 
expenditures in the t-th 
period. 
 
Australian National Accounts: National 
Income, Expenditure and Product 1981-
1992  (ABS) Cat. 5204.0 Australian 
National Accounts: State Accounts 1981-
1992  (ABS) Cat. 5220.0 
 
Pg' Perceived price of grantor 
(federal) expenditures in 
the t-th period. 
Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts 1981-1992  (ABS) Cat. 5220.0 
- 
Y Real per capita national 
income in the t-th period. 
Australian National Accounts: National 
Income, Expenditure and Product 1981-
1992  (ABS) Cat. 5204.0 
+ 
Pr' Perceived price of 
recipient (state and local) 
government expenditures 
in the t-th period. 
Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts 1981-1992  (ABS) Cat. 5220.0 
+ 
Rr Real per capita recipient 
(state and local) 
government expenditures 
in the t-th period. 
Australian National Accounts: State 
Accounts 1981-1992  (ABS) Cat. 5220.0 
+ 
U 
 
Unemployment rate as a 
proxy for institutional 
constraints in the t-th 
period. 
Australian Year Book 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1992  (ABS) Cat. 1301.0 
 
+ 
(1/Pg')Y 
 
Fraction of income 
directed to grantor 
government expenditures 
As for above components 
- 
(Pr'/Pg') Relative perception of 
grantor and recipient 
public good prices in the 
t-th period. 
As for above components 
- 
(1/Pg') 
 
Relative importance of 
federal grants in total 
federal expenditure in the 
t-th period. 
 
As for above components. 
- 
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TABLE 3   
Results of Regression Estimations for Federal Expenditure and Fiscal Illusion 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
   
CONSTANT 0.012374***  
(0.00182) 
-21.503***  
(2.5875) 
(1/Pg')Y 0.222E-02***  
(0.39301E-07) 
1.5893*** 
(0.24510) 
(Pr'/Pg') -0.739E-02***  
(0.1147E-02) 
-1.7724***  
(0.29833) 
(1/Pg') -0.604E-02***  
(0.9075E-03) 
-2.2219***  
(0.29017) 
U 0.4569E-04**  
(0.21358E-02) 
 
0.11077** 
(-0.038323) 
ESS 0.40744E-07 0.22582E-02 
R2 0.9785 0.9829 
R2 adjusted 0.9662 0.9732 
DWSTAT 2.14812 2.32728 
FPE 0.8245E-08 0.45701E+03 
LOG AIC -18.668 -7.7448 
LOG SC -18.465 -7.5427 
GCV 0.9978E-08 0.55302E-03 
HQ 0.7249E-08 0.40179E-03 
RICE 0.2037E-07 0.11291E-02 
SHIBATA 0.6224E-08 0.34500E-03 
SC 0.9561E-08 0.52995E-03 
AIC 0.7812E-08 0.43300E-03 
 
Values in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. 
Asterisk(s) represent the level of significance; * - 90 percent, 
** - 95 percent and *** - 99 percent. Bold diagnostic test 
denotes the model that is "best" for the criterion. Diagnostic 
tests may only be valid for unrestricted OLS regressions.  
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